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CHAPTER 9 
Contemporary Issues in Employment 
Relations—A Roundtable 
DAVID LEWIN, MODERATOR 
For the 2006 LERA research volume, leading scholars were assem-
bled in a roundtable for the purpose of eliciting their views on key con-
temporary industrial relations issues. The roundtable members were 
Adrienne E. Eaton, professor and director of labor extension in the 
Rutgers University School of Management and Labor Relations; Thomas 
A. Kochan, the George M. Bunker Professor of Management and direc-
tor of the Institute for Work and Employment Research in the MIT 
Sloan School of Management; David B. Lipsky, the Anne Evans 
Estabrook Professor of Dispute Resolution and former dean of the 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University; Daniel J.B. 
Mitchell, the Ho-Su Wu Chair in Management in the UCLA Anderson 
School of Management and former director of the UCLA Institute of 
Industrial Relations; and Paula B. Voos, professor and chair of the 
Department of Labor Studies and Employment in the Rutgers Univer-
sity School of Management and Labor Relations. The key issues were 
posed as questions, and the responses are summarized below. 
Lewin: In view of the secular decline of unionism in the United 
States and abroad, what is the potential for the emergence and 
growth of other forms of worker representation? 
Lipsky: There are two fundamental forms of worker representation, I 
believe; one form I label "independent," the other "dependent." Unionism 
is clearly an independent form of worker representation that allows 
workers to establish and maintain an organization "of the members, for 
the members, and by the members." A principal characteristic of inde-
pendent representation, therefore, is that the workers themselves con-
trol their representatives. There are several means by which workers can 
exercise such control, but two stand out: they can elect their representa-
tives or, alternatively, they can hire them. In the vast majority of unions 
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the officers are elected by the members, but in some unions business 
agents and administrators are hired by the organization. Indeed, in cer-
tain civil service and professional associations, top-level administrators 
("executive directors") exercise more influence on the organization's 
policies and practices than do elected officers. A hallmark of independ-
ent worker representation is that the policy makers and administrators 
are ultimately accountable to the members of the organization. 
Probably the best-known type of dependent representation is the so-
called company union, but there are many other varieties of this form. 
Any organization or entity that purports to speak for (i.e., "represent") 
workers but is not actually controlled by workers is a form of dependent 
representation. Every student of labor relations knows that the Wagner 
Act banned company unions. That statute made it an unfair labor practice 
for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or adminis-
tration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support 
to it." The Wagner Act virtually eliminated the company unions that were 
so prevalent during the 1920s. But in the last quarter of the 20th century, 
the increasing use of teams in American business enterprises once again 
raised the specter of company unionism. Teams have many of the charac-
teristics of unions, but is there any doubt that they are really established, 
financed, and ultimately controlled by employers? (No!) 
In the political arena, there are countless organizations that claim to 
represent the views of workers and their families. Some of them have 
been created by the labor movement (e.g., the AFL-CIO's Working 
America) and some are closely allied with it (e.g., the Alliance for 
Retired Americans). But it is quite evident that the vast majority of 
political action groups that claim to speak for American workers are nei-
ther financed nor controlled by them. To illustrate, consider the 
National Right to Work Committee, which asserts on its website 
(http://www.nrtwc.org/about/), "The members of the Committee are men 
and women—in all walks of life, from every corner of America, union 
members as well as nonunion employees—who, through their voluntary 
contributions, support the work of the Committee." This statement fails 
to mention that the committee is financed almost entirely by employers 
and business groups. 
It is probably no coincidence that the relative decline of authentic 
unionism in the United States has been accompanied by a dramatic 
increase in the use of teams in American industry. Also, political action 
groups and other organizations allied with the labor movement have 
struggled to maintain their strength, while various entities that profess to 
act on behalf of workers but are actually financed by business and con-
servative interests have proliferated. In other words, for three decades 
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or more dependent representation has been replacing the independent 
representation of American workers. I do not foresee a reversal of this 
trend in the immediate future because all the key factors that have con-
tributed to this development—globalization, deregulation, technological 
change, and the rebalancing of political power—will continue to shape 
the future of worker "representation." 
Eaton: I think we need to broaden our understanding of what a union 
is. For decades, scholars and trade unionists themselves have equated 
"union" with a collective bargaining agent, and the Wagner Act frame-
work has limited our thinking in this regard. More recently, both of 
those groups have been reconsidering this narrow definition. In a recent 
article in Labor Studies Journal focused on "managerial unionism," 
Paula Voos and I harked back to Sydney and Beatrice Webb to argue for 
a return to an expanded definition of unionism. As we point out, "The 
Webbs broadly defined a union as a 'continuous association of wage-
earners' for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of 
their working lives" (Eaton and Voos 2004, p. 25). We further explored 
this notion through the lens of the Webbs s "methods of trade unionism," 
which included collective bargaining as well as mutual insurance and 
legal enactment, but then expanded it to include the contemporary con-
cept of "skill development and career assistance." 
We then used this broadened definition to frame a review of organi-
zational types created by managerial employees to improve the condi-
tions of their working lives. These include intraorganizational forms like 
networks and caucuses, cross-organizational forms like professional asso-
ciations, and, in certain contexts, collective bargaining organizations. 
While our focus was on managerial workers, other scholars have applied 
many of these same ideas to other occupational groups, such as service 
workers (Cobble 1991), professional workers (Hurd and Bunge 2003), 
or any workers trying to survive in the more mobile and contingent 
labor markets of the contemporary era (Heckscher 2001; Osterman et al. 
2001). In this regard, my Rutgers colleague, Janice Fine, has been 
studying community unionism and worker centers, which tend to be 
oriented around the needs of low wage and immigrant workers (see 
Fine 2006). Though, in my view, there are notable problems and short-
comings in noncollective bargaining forms of unions—for example, 
underinstitutionalization—there is also considerable appeal of these 
newer forms to workers themselves. Further, these are not isolated phe-
nomena; there are substantial numbers of workers participating in all 
these different forms. An important question in this regard is whether 
these nontraditional forms of worker representation are interested in 
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and can ally themselves with the more traditional labor movement, per-
haps especially to create political power. 
Mitchell: There have been nonunion methods of obtaining employee 
input into decision making for a very long time, ranging from the simple 
suggestion box to the elaborate worker representation and "company 
union" plans developed during and after World War I; the quality circles of 
the 1980s also fall into this category. Although there was much fuss during 
the 1990s about the Wagner Act's limitation on company unions as a 
broader constraint on worker participation, the Wagner framework is 
basically "don't ask; don't tell." That is, there are undoubtedly many 
nonunion representation arrangements that likely would run afoul of 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) scrutiny if complaints were 
made, but which don't actually do so because no one complains. Further, 
nonunion firms often have grievance arrangements ranging from infor-
mal "open door" policies to more formal voice-type systems. The public 
sector in particular has long had formal grievance systems as part of the 
larger civil service apparatus. 
Outside of these particular microlevel arrangements, the legal system 
has provided another avenue for employee voice. In particular, the 
courts have evolved exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine and, 
in some cases, provided avenues for "wrongful discharge" claims. In still 
other cases, clever attorneys are able to rework what might otherwise be 
considered employee grievances to fit into complaint mechanisms for 
programs such as Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and Workers' 
compensation. 
Some scholars have argued that, apart from the arrangements out-
lined above, there is a large, pent-up demand among American workers 
for something like European-style works councils. Freeman and Rogers's 
(1999) survey evidence in particular is often taken as proof of such latent 
demand. But the problem with this argument is that while workers 
undoubtedly will say that at no cost they would like more influence on 
decision making, the depth of such sentiment can only be gauged when 
there is an explicit, specified cost—in question form, "Would you be 
willing to have your pay cut by 10% in order to have a works council?' It 
is most unlikely that such cost-posing questions would produce evidence 
of strong latent worker demand for works councils or the like. To 
emphasize this point, consider that there are over 400 congressional dis-
tricts in the United States, yet not one candidate that I am aware of has 
run for office on a platform of establishing works councils! 
It is true that, absent employer resistance, the unionization rate in 
the United States would be substantially higher than it actually is. The 
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gap between the public sector, in which almost 4 in 10 workers are 
union-represented, and the private sector, in which 1 in 10 workers are 
union-represented, is evidence for this proposition. Public employers 
are less resistant to unionization than private employers because public 
employers are subject to political constraints, are not exposed to pres-
sures to maximize profits, and tend to operate in areas where market 
competition is not (much of) a factor. Consequentiy, public employers 
resist unions considerably less than do private employers. 
The history of unionization in the United States is that key external 
events, such as the Great Depression, have been a major influence on 
unionization and on public policies related to employment more broadly; 
perhaps there will be such great events in the future. In particular, large-
scale terrorist attacks, a world financial crisis if Asian central banks 
dump their dollar reserves, or the failure of pensions, health care, and 
Social Security to carry the safety net load for the retiring baby boom 
generation could trigger new forms of employee voice. My guess, how-
ever, is that whatever employee voice is triggered by such events will be 
expressed largely through the political channel. 
Voos: If employees cannot use unions to express their distinctive inter-
ests and resolve the problems that they experience at the workplace, 
then I predict that they will attempt to improve their situation through 
other means. In democratic nations, it is likely that there will be added 
pressure for governmental solutions to common employee problems. 
These might include labor organizations that emphasize political rather 
than collective bargaining strategies or independent movements pressing 
for legislation in alliance with labor organizations. Recent examples in 
the United States include the numerous local movements for city and 
statewide living wages, legislative efforts (such as in California) to 
require employers to provide health insurance or (such as in Maryland) 
to contribute a certain proportion of compensation to health insurance, 
and interest group's (such as in New Jersey) lobbying for prevailing wage 
provisions for government subcontracted service employees. 
Alternatively, employees may seek redress of their work-related frus-
trations through increased litigation and the courts. Some of this litiga-
tion involves individual employment discrimination cases, while other 
litigation involves collective or class action cases. A notable example is 
the recent successful effort to ensure that grocery delivery workers in 
New York City, many of whom are undocumented immigrants, are not 
misclassified as independent contractors but, instead, are paid employ-
ees subject to the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 
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Finally, in nondemocratic nations, lack of access to either independent 
union representation or legitimate political means of expressing discon-
tent is likely to be associated with social unrest; China is a notable case 
in point.1 While it is hard to know how much of the recent rash of 
protests in China are responses to employment problems as opposed to 
environmental concerns, land seizures, provision of health care, and 
other issues, the lack of both independent unions and democratic politi-
cal parties in that nation seems clearly to be associated with manifest 
social unrest. 
Kochan: Given the widespread desire for a voice at work, the void left 
by the decline of traditional unions will be filled in some,way or another. 
Indeed, there is already a variety of "alternative" forms of voice and rep-
resentation emerging among different groups. My own view is that these 
will evolve into a mixture of alternative forms, including but perhaps not 
limited to: 
• Unions that develop new models and strategies for organizing and 
representing workers. Already we see unions like the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) and others that are organiz-
ing target groups, largely low-wage workers, through means that get 
around the election procedures of the NLRB through some mixture 
of corporate campaigns, community coalitions, neutrality agree-
ments, and, in some cases, such as at Kaiser Permanente, partner-
ship processes. Various combinations of these efforts will continue 
to be a source of new union members. 
• Professional organizations that represent members without formal 
collective bargaining rights are playing key roles in many occupa-
tions. Physical therapists have been active in setting certification 
standards and providing continuing education, joining more tradi-
tional professional groups like doctors, lawyers, architects, and other 
health care personnel in providing such services. These forms of 
representation need to be counted in any estimate of percentage of 
the "represented" workforce in today's economy. 
• Community groups, coalitions, and emerging institutions, such as 
the various worker centers, and ethnic groups, such as the 
Korean Immigrant Workers in Los Angeles at the low end and 
Indian and Chinese engineers and computer specialists at the 
high end. 
• Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that put pressure on cor-
porations to meet and monitor labor standards in their supply 
chains. 
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These forms are not mutually exclusive. Instead, there may be a mix 
of these models, such as community and ethnic group coalitions that 
work with unions to gain representation. Given this diversity of 
approaches, we need to stop equating "representation" with the number 
of workers covered under traditional forms of collective bargaining if we 
want to accurately measure, much less understand, the state of worker 
representation today and in the future. Finally, the wild card in predict-
ing the future of worker representation involves the American public. If 
and when the American public wakes up to the fact that basic rights of 
representation are unfairly suppressed and the effects of this suppres-
sion hit home to them, they may demand more responsible behavior on 
the part of employers and government. This is what it will take for these 
and other forms of worker representation to grow to a large scale. 
Lewin: How can the growth of both high-performance work sys-
tems (HPWS) and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems 
best be explained? 
Mitchell: The question presumes that there is a substantial growth of 
both types of systems and that both are part of the same package. It's not 
clear to me that HPWS are in fact experiencing dramatic growth; usually 
the issue is posed as "low road" versus "high road." There is no theory 
that says that a particular industry might not feature dual equilibriums, 
that is to say that, low-road firms that compete mainly on low labor costs 
might co-exist with high road firms with better pay, benefits, and condi-
tions. The issue turns on whether productivity gains that might come 
from high-road practices can offset low labor costs. 
Demonstration projects involving low-skill manufacturing, such as 
the Sweat-X experiment in Los Angeles, do not provide evidence that in 
such sectors there is a high road payoff. On the other hand, firms that 
employ a substantial number of highly skilled professionals generally 
need to be concerned that their human assets don't walk out the door. 
Long-term labor force projections indicate slow growth in the share of 
managerial and professional workers, so one might expect high road 
practices to grow slowly, too. The key point is that this is a sectoral issue. 
What matters most are the production technology and the degree of 
reliance on highly skilled workers who are costly to replace. 
Alternative dispute resolution is a separate issue. What is the process 
an alternative to? In the union sector, strike frequency appears to have 
fallen, particularly in the early 1980s, when the most dramatic losses of 
union membership occurred. It is not clear, however, that the decline in 
strike propensity reflects increased usage of traditional alternatives, such 
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as mediation and/or interest arbitration. Within the union sector, we 
really have no reliable information as to whether such approaches as 
"med-arb" are in fact replacing traditional grievance and arbitration sys-
tems in rights disputes. 
In the nonunion sector, because of the propensity to litigate and the 
erosion of at-will employment, use of such techniques as requiring 
employees to acknowledge at-will status, treating them as independent 
contractors, or requiring that employment disputes be settled through 
alternatives to courts is surely growing. Some of these responses are of 
questionable legality. That doesn't mean, however, that they are not 
being used and are not growing in usage. 
Kochan: Union avoidance is part but not all of the explanation for the 
growth of HPWS and ADR. It is overly simplistic to see union avoid-
ance as the only factor causing their growth. HPWS also have grown 
because they offer significant productivity and service quality benefits, 
and the majority of workers prefer them to more detailed and tightly 
constricted job designs. The problem is that they started first in 
nonunion settings and were used as union avoidance tactics. Therefore, 
union leaders were (and in some cases still are) slow to see their poten-
tial benefits for union members and union management relationships. 
Where unions have embraced and adapted these processes to union-
management settings and are involved in overseeing their use, they can 
produce and have produced joint gains. 
ADR is also a response to the growing costs of litigation. Here we 
have the same problem: unions have been slow to see how they could 
incorporate and champion ADR as a service to current and potential 
members. If unions took this more adaptive approach, ADR would not 
only spread more rapidly, but the due process standards that are needed 
for ADR to become a useful public policy tool would be more readily 
enforceable. 
Eaton: I'm not convinced that the growth of HPWS that was well docu-
mented a decade ago has been sustained. I would go even further and 
speculate that there may be a decline in the overall use of these systems. 
As far as I know, there is no recent evidence for the prevalence of the 
practices commonly associated with HPWS. My sense of this is related 
in part to the steady decline in manufacturing in which, at least in the 
union sector (the sector with which I'm most familiar), many of these 
practices are quite well known if not common. Whereas 10 or 20 years 
ago management may have been interested in engaging the workforce 
and the union in reforming the production system, the pressures today 
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seem to be pushing management heavily toward the off-shoring option. 
At the same time, there has been some growth in labor-management 
partnerships and the attendant use of high performance work practices 
in parts of the health care industry and in the public sector. Whether 
these initiatives can be sustained given the pressures those sectors are 
also under remains unclear. Perhaps, as a field, we should be asking 
today about the impaction HPWS of the erosion of high-quality health 
care and retirement benefits. In general, the "low road," as exemplified 
by Wal-Mart, remains a compelling alternative for some if not many 
companies and industries, although that model, especially at Wal-Mart 
itself, is encountering considerable public pressure and questions about 
its performance. 
I'm more sanguine about the continued growth of ADR practices, 
although here again I have not seen any recent data indicating that 
growth has continued. In their literature review, Bingham and Chachere 
(1999) listed the most common reasons employers gave for the adoption 
of ADR, which were to reduce the risk, cost, and slow speed of litigation; 
respond to a changing regulatory environment that encouraged ADR; 
more strongly focus on the disputants' underlying interests rather than 
the validity of their positions; improve productivity through reducing 
unwanted absenteeism and turnover and increased organizational com-
mitment; achieve greater confidentiality; and avoid unionization. A cur-
sory review of these motivations suggests that there has probably been 
little change in most of them. The shifting legal framework may have 
undermined some practices, particularly mandatory arbitration, but 
overall it continues to provide encouragement to ADR. Looser labor 
markets in some industries and for many occupational groups may have 
decreased worries about employee turnover for some employers, but for 
many others (for example, in health care) employee retention remains an 
important goal. And, while union density still appears to be in long-term 
decline, there is also sufficient organizing activity in some sectors to 
keep union avoidance on the radar screen for many employers. In short, 
absent any evidence to the contrary, I hypothesize that ADR systems will 
continue to grow. 
Lipsky: For the past decade, Ron Seeber and I have been conducting 
research on the rise of ADR (Lipsky and Seeber 1998; Lipsky, Seeber, and 
Fincher 2003; Lipsky and Seeber 2004, 2006; Seeber and Lipsky 2005). 
Our research has been based on a survey of the Fortune 1000 companies, 
a survey of the members of the National Academy of Arbitrators, on-site 
interviews with managers and lawyers at about 60 major U.S. corporations, 
and other data sources. In our research, we find that virtually all major 
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U.S.-based corporations nowadays use arbitration, mediation, or other 
third-party techniques to resolve workplace disputes. These techniques 
may be used either on an ad hoc basis or as a matter of policy. More 
specifically, we estimate that about 40% of the Fortune 1000 compa-
nies use ADR techniques as a matter of policy (Lipsky, Seeber, and 
Fincher 2003). . . '-
What accounts for the rise of ADR in the United States? Over a 30-
year period, from 1963 to 1993, Congress passed at least two dozen 
major statutes regulating employment conditions. These statutes gave 
rise to new areas of litigation, ranging from sexual harassment and 
accommodation of the disabled to age discrimination and wrongful ter-
mination. More and more dimensions of the employment relationship 
were brought under the scrutiny of the judicial system and a multitude 
of regulatory agencies. Over time, litigants (especially employers) 
expressed increasing frustration with the legal system because of the 
long delays in resolving disputes, the costs associated with these delays, 
and the often unsatisfactory outcomes. Hence, they increasingly turned 
to ADR as a means of avoiding these costs and delays. 
ADR is principally a phenomenon of the nonunion workplace. No 
informed observer of employment relations believes that the relative 
decline of unionism has been accompanied by a decline in workplace 
conflict. Nonunion employers realized that they had to devise a means of 
dealing with workplace disputes, and that relying on litigation clearly was 
not the answer. ADR had the great advantage over litigation of providing 
a faster, cheaper, and more efficient means of resolving employment dis-
putes. Some employers, however, came to believe that using ADR was 
(also) an effective means of avoiding unionization. In the interviews we 
conducted with employers, a handful acknowledged that union avoid-
ance was one of the main reasons why they turned to ADR. 
Seeber and I also discovered, however, that there is a link between 
the growing use of HPWS and the rise of ADR. But to understand this 
link, one has to recognize that many U.S. corporations are moving 
beyond ADR toward the adoption of so-called integrated conflict man-
agement systems. Such a system does not simply feature the use of cer-
tain third-party dispute resolution techniques or even the adoption of a 
set of conflict resolution policies. Rather, an integrated conflict manage-
ment system "introduces a systematic approach to preventing, manag-
ing, and resolving conflict that focuses on the causes of conflict within 
the organization" (Gosline et al. 2001, p. 8). In Emerging Systems for 
Managing Workplace Conflict,, we wrote, "The reorganization of the 
workplace has had pronounced implications for conflict management in 
that a workplace conflict management system is the logical handmaiden 
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of a high-performance work system" (Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 
2003:68). In our survey of Fortune 1000 companies and our fieldwork, 
we discovered that a company that had adopted advanced workplace 
practices, such as team-based production, was more likely to have a con-
flict management system. While the correlation between the use of a 
conflict management system and the use of advanced human resource 
practices is not perfect, a growing number of managers have come to 
realize that delegating the responsibility for controlling work to teams is 
consistent with delegating authority for preventing or resolving conflict 
among the members of those teams (Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003). 
Voos: Both HPWS and ADR systems have been instituted by employers 
who are seeking to reduce cost and improve productivity. ADR systems 
have been initiated in order to control litigation costs arising when dis-
satisfied employees seeking redress in the courts for perceived violations 
of employment law. Further, they may also address violations of the 
employers established personnel policies. 
HPWS often include assurances that employees will be treated fairly 
and will not be punished for exercising voice, that is, for criticizing exist-
ing practices and suggesting improved ones. Where employees are not 
union represented and lack grievance arbitration systems to protect "just 
cause," having an ADR system in place should make such assurances 
more credible. Hence, there is a positive correlation between the two. 
Lewin: Is human resource management (HRM) being "crowded 
out" by organizational behavior (OB) in similar fashion to the 
earlier crowding out of industrial relations (IB.) by HRM? 
Kochan: There are both practice and research/teaching dimensions of 
the current state of HRM that are relevant here, and they are interre-
lated. In my view, the bloom is off the rose of "strategic HRM." Only in 
a subset of the largest U.S. firms do HR executives have a significant, 
influential role in firm strategy formulation; finance still rules the day, 
with HR far behind. Moreover, many of the operational tasks formerly 
carried out within the HR function are now being dispersed to contract 
firms, off-shore data management operations, line managers who do 
their own HR decision making, and subcontractors, temporary help, and 
consulting firms that provide workers and/or help in recruitment, train-
ing, and compensation research. The sooner that HR educators recog-
nize these realities, the more they will have an opportunity to adjust 
their teaching of HR to managers and/or HR majors to match the nature 
of the jobs managers and HR professionals actually do. Until then, they 
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will be educating and training people for the careers of yesterday and 
lose credibility with students and faculty peers. 
Within universities, however, OB programs are doing no better in 
training the next generation of HR professors. Few OB graduates under-
stand much about HR, even though they are increasingly asked to teach 
these courses. The opportunity therefore exists for modern IR or work 
and employment programs to fill this gap. 
Eaton: I have no idea but I want to push back a bit on the idea of indus-
trial relations—small "i," small "r"—research being crowded out by 
HRM. The teaching of IR and the institutionalization of IR have, with-
out doubt, been crowded out by HR. However, there is reason to believe 
that there is a resurgence of research on topics that have traditionally 
been within the domain of IR. In particular, I would argue that with the 
continued decline of institutional approaches in* the field of labor eco-
nomics, sociology has slowly and steadily moved to fill this gap. Much of 
the best work on labor market outcomes is being done by economic soci-
ologists, often using more or less the same research tools and methods 
that economists use. This has been most evident at Rutgers whenever 
we conduct a search for a new faculty member for my department (labor 
studies and employment relations): most, though not all, of the interest-
ing research being done by young scholars in our areas of interest is 
being done by sociologists. It's interesting to note, too, that the labor and 
labor movements section of the American Sociological Association now 
claims 500 members! To put this in perspective, for 2005, the Labor and 
Employment Relations Association (LERA) reported only 940 academic 
members from all disciplines—and only 26 who identified themselves as 
sociologists. One question I have about this trend is whether sociologists 
in sociology departments will find ways to engage in policy debates with 
practitioners so that research informs practice and practice informs 
research. 
Lipsky: My perspective on this question is shaped largely by my interac-
tions with human resource management executives affiliated with the 
National Academy of Human Resources (NAHR) and the Cornell 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations s Center for Advanced Human 
Resource Studies (CAHRS). There is some overlap in membership 
between the two groups, but in total there are about 120 senior-level HR 
executives in the two organizations. I do not participate in all the pro-
grams and forums that the NAHR and CAHRS conduct, but to the best 
of my knowledge the question posed here has not yet been discussed by 
either organization. On the website maintained by the Society for 
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Human Resource Management—an organization that now has over 
200,000 members—I checked recent conferences to see if this question 
arose in any of them, and I failed to find a single reference to it. 
What questions are these HR managers and practitioners currently 
discussing? There seems to be a blending of hardy perennials and seem-
ingly new varietals. (I say "seemingly new" because to this veteran many of 
the so-called new topics seem to be old wine in new bottles.) For example, 
current and recent topics covered by CAHRS's executive education pro-
grams include "HR Strategy: Creating Competitive Advantage through 
People," "Managing for Impact: HR Metrics and Firm Performance," and 
"HR Transformation: Partnering to Achieve Functional Excellence." 
These topics might have appeared in the executive education curricula 
of any leading university 10 or even 20 years ago. Further, the same 
buzzwords appear over and over again in the programs sponsored by HR 
organizations: globalization, strategy, metrics, planning, culture, partner-
ing, and so on. Other popular terms that have entered the lexicon of HR 
managers in recent years include agility, flexibility, talent, and alignment. 
Even more recently, I have noticed a growing infatuation with "engage-
ment" and "branding." (Full disclosure requires me to acknowledge that 
I am currentiy developing a five-day executive education program that 
includes a full day on "engaging the workforce.") 
Is HRM being crowded out by OB? Although there is no evidence 
in the current programs of major HR organizations suggesting that the 
answer is yes, perhaps those organizations are the last place one would 
find such evidence. Quite possibly, if I had a chance to interact regularly 
with CEOs and top-level managers in other functions, I might have a 
different impression. In the field research I have conducted in numer-
ous corporations, I have definitely encountered individuals in other cor-
porate functions who are disenchanted with the HR function. We do not 
have to conduct systematic research to know that many rank-and-file 
employees, first-line supervisors, and middle managers are not particu-
larly fond of HR managers. The HR managers, many believe, are those 
picky bureaucrats who make us fill in multiple forms and get in the way 
of our doing the real work we need to do. And anyone who has spent any 
length of time in a corporate environment knows that turf wars are rou-
tine in many corporations. Innopently or not, HR has more than its share 
of such turf wars (see, for example, Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher 2003, 
pp. 135-37). If OB is crowding out HRM, then I suspect a root cause is 
the ongoing tension between HR specialists and other constituencies in 
many organizations. 
I would, however, like to say a word in defense of HR. To coin a 
phrase, some of my best friends are HR managers. The best HR managers 
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are dedicated professionals who work hard not only on behalf of manage-
ment and the company's shareholders, but also on behalf of the organiza-
tion's employees. I do not know whether OB is crowding out HRM, but I 
do know that a first-class organization needs talented managers who are 
skilled at dealing with people. You can choose to call managers who spe-
cialize in dealing with employees "personnel managers," "employee rela-
tions managers," or "human resource managers," but at the end of the day 
someone has to perform this critical function in an organization. As the 
bard once wrote, "What's in a name? That which we call a rose . . . By any 
other name would smell as sweet." 
Voos: This question seems to be largely about the internal politics of 
business schools, and I am not the best person to weigh in on that 
matter. Business school HR professors need to remember Marx when 
they think about this issue: It's not a matter of ideas dueling it out in 
the "superstructure," it's a matter of what is going on in the economy, 
"the base." 
The decline of the academic field of industrial relations in the 
United States has been due primarily to external factors. First, the inte-
gration of labor relations into "normal operating procedures" in union-
ized corporations meant that it was less interesting to academics—in the 
1960s, for instance, labor relations were simply less of a pressing social 
problem than civil rights or other emerging social movements. Second, 
declining unionization took its toll. That is, industrial relations was not 
"pushed out" by HRM in any intellectual sense; rather, over time, there 
was a shift in academic jobs because of the need to train more HR 
professionals and fewer labor relations professionals, given declining 
unionization. 
Currently, in some corporations, HR for lower-level employees is 
being outsourced, automated through online systems or call centers, and 
otherwise managed in ways to cut cost—as opposed to being used for 
strategic organizational purposes.2 Insofar as there are fewer HR jobs, 
HR academics must be concerned. However, it seems to me that this 
contemporary tendency is inherently limited by the need for the HR 
function and by the fact that much of it cannot be satisfactorily out-
sourced for core employees. Of course, the key unanswered questions 
are "Who are the truly core employees in any corporation?" and "How 
many of them will be left as corporations restructure?" 
Mitchell: HRM is a functional area of the firm. The area can be man-
aged through an internal structure in the organization, and some 
aspects of it can be outsourced. But even in the outsourcing case, some-
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one is performing the function. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
has estimated that in 2004 there were 820,000 "human resources, training, 
and labor relations managers and specialists." The BLS projects that this 
grouping will grow faster than average for the workforce as a whole 
through 2014. (The BLS's projections do not go beyond 2014, but that 
does not mean that the relative growth will stop as of that date.) Most of 
these workers are carrying out basic activities necessary for the function-
ing of their employers. While some of them have certainly been edu-
cated or trained in organizational behavior—or have at least been 
exposed to it—they are still carrying out the HRM function. And the job 
descriptions for these workers provided by the BLS do not suggest a 
substantial OB component. 
As far as firms are concerned, therefore, the replacement of IR by 
HRM is not a precedent for the replacement of HRM by OB. IR was in 
practice linked to the union sector and to union-management relations. 
Therefore, IR declined as the union sector declined. There is no similar 
counterpart to this process when it comes to OB. 
The answer is different when academia is the target of the question. 
OB can be viewed as a general management skill as opposed to HRM, 
which focuses on a particular function. The upper tier of MBA educa-
tional institutions, in particular, do not produce substantial numbers of 
graduates who plan to make their careers in HRM. Graduates of such 
programs are more likely to view themselves as management generalists. 
These tendencies suggest that within business schools, especially those 
in the upper tier of management education, HRM will in the future 
receive less emphasis and OB more. 
Where, then, will the "human resources, training, and labor relations 
managers and specialists" come from, particularly since their ranks will 
be growing faster than average? Many will simply be college graduates 
or graduates of specialized masters programs that do focus on HRM. 
Others will receive their training on the job or through extension-type 
programs or at lower-tier institutions. A relatively small number will 
come from upper-tier business schools. 
Lewin: What are the main benefits and limitations of government 
regulation of contemporary employment relationships? 
Voos: U.S. industrial relations has a long tradition of emphasizing the 
limitations of government regulation—John Dunlop, for instance, 
often weighed in against the "one size fits all" nature of employment 
regulation, which inevitably is not appropriately sensitive to the 
tremendous variation in workplaces. More recently, Pfeffer (1994) 
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argued that collective bargaining is preferable to government regula-
tion because of its flexibility for the employer. Moreover, the govern-
ment enforcement function is often underresourced and unable to 
effectively regulate the large number of employers in the United 
States. Further, much employment regulation relies on the desires of 
decent employers to abide by the law. 
By contrast, the main benefit of government regulation is that it may 
be the best game in town. This is because when it is difficult to unionize 
or when unions have not organized the relevant market, government 
regulation may become the primary way to improve standards of work. 
Regulation has the benefit of "taking wages out of competition" in the 
broadest sense. Laws that are universal protect high-standard employers 
from low-standard competitors—or at least from those located in the 
same legal jurisdiction. Efforts to enact and enforce global labor stan-
dards might be understood in parallel fashion. In addition, laws are able 
to address the employment problems in those layers of'the workforce, 
such as white-collar employees in private corporations, managers, and 
contingent employees, for whom unionism and collective bargaining are 
difficult to achieve. All of this makes me think that labor problems are 
increasingly likely to evoke public policy—that is, regulatory solutions— 
in the near future. 
Lipsky: Although many people view government regulation as a partisan 
political issue, some reflection on the topic suggests that actually it is 
not. Similarly, some assume that Democrats favor government regulation 
and Republicans oppose it, but this generalization oversimplifies a com-
plex issue. For example, many Democrats believe that corporations 
require more government regulation, while many Republicans disagree. 
At the same time, many Republicans believe that labor unions require 
more government regulation, while many Democrats disagree. When it 
comes to an interest group s view of government regulation, it depends 
on whose ox is being gored. It is worth remembering that the deregula-
tion of American industry was begun by Jimmy Carter—a Democrat, of 
course—when my Cornell colleague, Alfred Kahn, then serving as chair 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, persuaded the president that the deregu-
lation of the airline industry was a good idea. (That deregulation very 
quickly resulted in decreased air service to and from Ithaca, New York, 
which made it much more difficult for all of us at Cornell—including 
Professor Kahn—to travel to Washington!) 
My view of government regulation is substantially influenced by my 
training as an economist. Economists are generally skeptical of the utility 
of regulation and believe that markets are more effective than regulation 
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in governing the employment relationship. All regulations should be 
subjected to. rigorous cost-benefit analyses, economists believe, and 
there should be careful accounting in those analyses of the unintended 
consequences—externalities—of the regulations. My view of this matter, 
however, has been tempered by hard reality and personal experience. In 
recent years, my colleagues and I have conducted evaluations of a num-
ber of workplace dispute resolution programs, and I have been forcefully 
struck by the extraordinary difficulty of measuring the costs and benefits 
of these programs. In one case, our good-faith effort to do an honest eval-
uation produced a negative appraisal that offended the stakeholders who 
had established and supported the program we evaluated. In my (possibly 
biased) view, political interests trumped rational analysis in this instance. 
I find it difficult to believe that an increasingly complex society does 
not require some optimal level of government regulation. The labor 
market is rife with imperfections—more than most economists are will-
ing to acknowledge—and arguably government regulation can help 
counterbalance those imperfections. Even if labor markets conformed to 
conventional economic theory and produced efficient outcomes, there is 
no guarantee that such outcomes would be equitable. This truism consti-
tutes the conventional case for labor market regulation. What is often 
missing from the conventional case, I believe, is adequate regard for the 
influence of politics and power on labor market outcomes. Political 
power can lead to regulations that tip the scales in favor of one or 
another interest group, and the remedy for that imbalance is not deregu-
lation but a change in the power equation. 
Certainly government regulation can significantly influence work-
place employment relationships, and often the benefits of that regulation 
far outweigh the costs. But government regulation can also be a blunt 
instrument, ill suited for many types of employment problems. Histori-
cally, I believe, the most powerful force affecting employment relation-
ships in the United States and most Western nations has been unionism. 
Arguably, a free and democratic labor movement has had a more dra-
matic influence on working conditions than government regulation, 
though I acknowledge that there have been exceptions to this generaliza-
tion. For example, only strong government intervention could have 
undercut the racial segregation of jobs—a historic task that unions were 
ill equipped, and possibly disinclined, to perform. But the belief that gov-
ernment regulation is an adequate substitute for unionism and collective 
bargaining is, in my view, clearly wrongheaded. Over the last 30 years, 
worker wages have stagnated, job insecurity has increased, the cost of 
health care has skyrocketed and the number of workers without coverage 
has mushroomed, and our pension system has weakened, possibly to the 
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point of collapse. Evidently, the relative decline in the union movement, 
the deregulation of American industry, and the contrasting growth of gov-
ernment regulation of the workplace over the last three decades has, on 
balance, turned out to be a bad deal for American workers. 
Mitchell: It has traditionally been assumed by economists that "compet-
itive" (i.e., nonunion) labor markets will provide an optimal matching of 
employer needs and employee preferences. In this view, only if informa-
tion gaps exist—for example, workers don't know of the dangers entailed 
in certain job tasks but employers do—is there a need for government. 
In other words, with full information there is no problem. Those workers 
who are willing to take risks will become roofers while those who espe-
cially value job safety will become clerks. Employers will compete for 
workers by offering the mix of wages and benefits needed to attract 
whatever types of workers they need. If this model is taken as the 
default, then unions or government regulations that raise pay, alter the 
mix of pay to benefits, or impose safety or other standards, are inher-
ently distortionary. 
This view was not always prevalent. The early 20th-century institu-
tional school of economists viewed the nonunion labor market as 
monopsonistic, a view also expressed in the preamble to the Wagner Act 
of 1935, which refers to an "inequality of bargaining power" tilted 
against employees. Economists of later decades acknowledged monop-
sony but viewed it as an unusual circumstance typically involving 
employer collusion. Thus, the perennial nursing shortage spawned a lit-
erature suggesting that hospital associations held down nurses' pay. 
Other examples include professional sports in which leagues restrained 
interteam competition, and isolated company towns dominated by single 
employers. 
As Chris Erickson and I (Mitchell and Erickson 2005) have shown, 
monopsony is a useful way of interpreting a much larger segment of the 
nonunion labor market than just nursing, sports, and company towns. A 
simple search model produces an upward sloping supply curve of labor 
to an employer, and an upward sloping supply curve is all you need for 
monopsony. One symptom of such monopsony is employer complaints of 
labor shortage. Such shortages became commonplace in the late 1980s 
and again in the 1990s, when much of the labor market was not only 
nonunion but also not confronted with a threat of unionization. Another 
symptom is a constant refrain that immigrants are needed because 
Americans won't do the work. Yet, one might ask, "Who made the beds 
in hotels, washed the dishes in restaurants, and so on, in the 1950s, if not 
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Americans?" Or "If Americans won't do unpleasant jobs, who is mining 
coal nowadays in West Virginia?" 
Monopsonistic labor markets will provide less-than-optimal working 
conditions, benefits, safety, and pay; thus, some form of regulation could 
improve efficiency. But all regulations are not justified by monopsony. 
There can be harmful regulations; the details matter. Moreover, as 
Erickson and I (2005) also show, there are some benefits to monopsony 
at the macro level. In essence, chronic labor shortages tend to moderate 
recessions because declining demand leads employers to "lay off vacan-
cies before terminating real employees. The puzzling stylized facts of the 
macroeconomy in the period beginning in the late 1980s can be 
explained by monopsony. These stylized facts include, among others, 
chronic labor shortages, shallow recessions, absorption of workers 
moved off welfare without a hike in unemployment, and growth in the 
relative share of company profits. 
Kochan: We will definitely see a growing role for government regula-
tion of employment relationships, continuing the trend that has been vis-
ible since the 1960s. The decline of unions and collective bargaining and 
the growing recognition that individual firms are not able or willing to 
protect worker rights or provide the benefits (health insurance, pen-
sions, training, work-family leave, etc.) that workers expect and need will 
continue to put pressure on state and federal governments to respond. 
The real question in my mind is whether we will develop more flexi-
ble enforcement tools to cope with increased regulations. These could 
include use of performance standards (i.e., holding firms accountable for 
meeting standards but leaving it to firms and their employees to decide 
how to meet them), some forms of ADR, and/or some forms of worker 
voice and representation in the design, monitoring, and enforcement 
processes. I continue to believe that we can develop a two-track enforce-
ment strategy in which those firms that can demonstrate they have pro-
cedures and institutional arrangements in place to deliver and meet 
public policy standards are given the flexibility they want and need on 
how to meet them, while firms lacking these workplace institutions and 
procedures are regulated in more detailed, traditional ways. Incentives 
for moving from the latter to the former category would serve the econ-
omy, workforce, and society well. 
Eaton: One of the chief limitations of government regulation is the 
globalization of the economy. As trade agreements begin to undermine 
national regulatory systems, not just of the labor market but of the envi-
ronment, consumer-business relations, and so on, it is increasingly 
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important to look at the potential but also the weaknesses of interna-
tional forms of regulation. These may include trade and other agree-
ments and treaties between or among nations, but they increasingly 
involve "voluntary" codes of conduct, sometimes negotiated between 
private parties (i.e., corporations and NGOs). It's interesting to note that 
at the same time that the United States is increasing its participation in 
what may be a nascent system of global regulation, many of the most 
interesting developments in government regulation of employment 
within the United States are taking place at the state level or on occasion 
at the local level, rather than at the national level. I'm thinking here of 
living wage ordinances or statutes, state minimum wage laws, state 
antidiscrimination laws that expand the list of protected classes or types 
of discrimination beyond those covered by federal law, and even 
attempts to push the boundaries of preemption in federal labor relations 
law. 
Notes 
1
 According to China's public security minister, Zhou Yonghang, 3.76 million 
Chinese took part in such "mass incidents" in 20Q5; he states that they were protests 
over specific economic issues, not efforts to bring down the one-party political system 
(Cody 2005). 
2
 My colleague Jeff Keefe (2006) points out, "In the late 1990s with the labor mar-
ket at full employment, there was a substantial boom in HR employment as rapidly 
growing firms searched for qualified employees. Some analysts misread a temporary 
phenomenon as a structural change in the strategic importance of the HR function 
within the corporation. Once the economy went into recession, taking costs out of 
organizations became imperative. One method for reducing cost selected by some 
organizations has been to outsource a range of HR functions." 
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